

PUFFET  
MICHEL  
Major  
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HQ Kigali Sector

1. a. My duties on 06 April until my departure on 17 April:  
Duty officer at HQ sector.  
  
b. Mission and orders: maintain the radio networks and Tf 24/7  
Role held by 4 officers (2 BE and 2 BEN)  
Reinforced from 06 April.  
  
c. The Tutsi population felt threatened especially from February (daily attacks). The POWER movement (pro Hutu extremists) which crossed a lot of parties was more and more anti-Belgian or rather showed it to us more and more.  
The French were considered as protectors of the Habyarimana regime. Their replacement at Kigali by Belgians who:
  - Had abandoned the regime in 1990 when the war against the rebels was still not won (those from Zaire and the French continued to support Habyarimana)
  - Had not delivered munitions already paid for in 1990;
  - Had met the rebel leaders;
  - Had taken an active part in the ARUSHA accords that the Hutu extremists have never accepted,was very badly perceived by the Power movement. Petitions were organised in certain newspapers, calling upon the French and proposing the return home of the Belgians (December 93).  
Excesses committed by the Belgians of MINUAR were grist to the mill of the anti-Belgian propaganda. Radio 1000 colline exploited this to the max.

2. Information

a. Within the framework of the attack

From 07 in the morning a Tutsi person in my entourage (pro Belgian) was convinced that the Belgians were the origin of the attack and that was despite my denial. The official radio in an official press release broadcast unceasingly, accused the Belgians and FPR.

b. The assassination of the 10 paras on 7 April

On 7 April in the morning, I had Tf contact with a G3 Ops officer (a Major of EM FAR) who told me that it was Kigali camp which was involved in this problem (10 Belgians of MINUAR taken prisoner by FAR and probably taken to Kigali camp) I interpreted this reply at as an end to the communication. I insisted by stating that the incident was sufficiently grave such that EM FAR should get involved, to which the person involved replied with bad grace that he would see if he could do something. It should be known that the EM FAR was located at Kigali camp.

c. The massacres that followed the attack

The massacres began immediately.

The attack of the FPR from the CND took place afterwards: 07 or 08.

From the 7<sup>th</sup> in the morning:

- Soldiers presented themselves at the Meridien hotel, claiming certain Tutsis;
- Soldiers, in teams of four to five men, controlled the indigenous city around the Meridien hotel. I heard automatic weapons fire and grenade explosions, all of it seemed very well organised.
- Before the massacres Tutsis had complained to me and to others that lists were being drawn up. The way in which the massacres were organised from 06 in the evening only confirmed the existence of massacre plans.

Other witnesses: the appeals for help from Rwandan civilians by Tf 6 April and and before.

d. The actions of Georges RUGGIU

BEFORE 06 April: daily anti-Belgian messages but no call to murder Belgians.

AFTER 06 April: call for murder of Tutsis an accusation against the Belgians for the attack against the president.

3. Other witnesses to be consulted to my knowledge

Nobody in particular but those responsible for UNAMIR, Rwandans and FPR generally without forgetting the ONG.

4. Remarks regarding the behaviour of the police and FAR BEFORE 6 April

- a. During the month of December 1993, I was liaison officer between the Rwandan police and KIGALI sector HQ of the UN. That allowed me to note that despite the praiseworthy efforts of General NDINDILYIMANA to remain neutral in the ethnic conflict, on a local basis, the Gd brigades and patrols did not protect the threatened Tutsis and did not act for their benefit, EXCEPT occasionally and forced by us.
- b. Despite the security operation for the Kigali zone carried out by the UN, elements of FAR and the local police continued to move around armed in the zone without the common measures with which this was authorised by the ARUSHA accords.  
It should be confessed that this ill will of FAR in the application of the ARUSHA accords was encouraged by the laxness of the UN on this subject.

My personal contacts with FAR in the town leave no doubt: the Belgians were poorly seen by the FAR.

Signature  
PUFFET  
23/1856